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WOMEN’S MORAL AGENCY AND THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN GAZA STRIP 
Aitemad Muhanna 
 
This essay analyzes empirical data compiled in Gaza Strip between November 2011 
and March 2012. The author examines how Nariman, an Islamist woman who at the 
time of the interviews on which this article is based held a powerful position in both 
the Hamas government and the local community, connects her ideal virtues to her 
social and political practices and how this dynamic contributes to developing a more 
articulated, critical, and creative form of agency. Although the model of moral agency 
developed in this essay does not claim to deconstruct discursive gender norms, it 
resignifies these norms from the social and cultural domain to the divine domain (in 
other words, women act as equal agents of God and do not fear anyone except God), 
which allows Nariman to liberate herself from the control of the discursive gender 
norms. 
 
In this essay, I aim to explore the model of women’s moral agency in the particular 
context of the Gaza Strip. I focus on the analytical narration of a Muslim woman named 
Nariman,1 who has succeeded in powerfully positioning herself in Hamas Islamist movement 
institutions as well as wider social institutions. Nariman is thirty-one years old and hails from 
Rafah, south of the Gaza Strip. She grew up the eldest daughter in a wealthy family with no 
sons; she experienced almost no social or cultural constraints based on her gender. Her 
parents supported their daughters’ education and did not put pressure on any of them to 
conform to certain gendered norms. Nariman lived her childhood and teenage years in 
comfort and managed her life in a relatively free family atmosphere as compared with many 
                                                             
1 A well-known figure in Gaza society, Nariman gave me permission to use her real name and information I 
gathered through several interviews with her.  
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other women in Gaza. She is a wife with five children but was able to continue her education 
after she was married. She completed her undergraduate study in information technology at 
Al-Aqsa University in Gaza, her master’s in Islamic education at the Islamic University in 
Gaza, and was pursuing her PhD in philosophy of education at Zaqazeeq University in Egypt. 
She is an active member of Hamas, and in 2008, the Hamas government appointed her head 
of the Women’s Police Unit.  
I did not select Nariman’s case for the sake of generalization or theorization of 
women’s moral agency. Rather, I use the narration of her life story as an individual example 
of a religious woman who challenges the dichotomist, singular, or harmonic conception of 
women’s moral agency that almost demonstrates a singular political or theoretical setting, 
whether it is liberal or nonliberal. Yet the specific model of moral agency I study here 
remains rare, and its replication among other women in Gaza is not predictable. Religious, 
like unreligious, Gazan women reflect on their diverse individual experiences to continuously 
reshape their own subjectivity, responding to not only the changing context but also the 
changing knowledge, interests, and desires they accumulate throughout their interaction with 
the social world.  
I intentionally focus on this one self-reflective and creative Muslim woman who bases 
her creative and critical agency on moral and religious arguments stemming from her deep 
knowledge and practice of Islam. This model of moral agency is characterized by a 
combination of rationality, morality, and discursive, reflective, and creative practice for 
meeting the changes she desired at the personal and societal level—to personally satisfy her 
desired subject to be an ideal Muslim woman, as well as to be socially and politically 
recognized, by transferring the message of Islam into social institutions and people’s patterns 




The Context of Islamization in Gaza 
Since the early 1990s, Hamas leaders realized that the strategy of resisting Israeli 
occupation through military action was no longer possible under the enormous Israeli and 
international pressure against Hamas. As a result, Hamas shifted its attention to Islamizing 
Palestinian society by intensifying its social and ideological interventions into the local 
communities.2 Hamas established numerous charities, developed a network that surpassed in 
both size and efficiency those of other Palestinian factions, and established a reputation of 
accountability and transparency against the corruption of the secular-based governing 
institutions, thereby ensuring enduring grassroots support and donations. Hamas used the 
charities not only to provide social services but also to propagate its project of Islamizing 
social institutions. For Hamas, mosques were, and are still, the major sites of popular 
religious and political mobilization. People’s involvement in religious activities at mosques 
was used widely to build strong networking skills and connections between the people and 
Hamas organizations.3  
The strategy of Islamizing society gained massive popular support for Hamas and 
encouraged more people, particularly educated women, to get involved in Hamas mobilizing 
activities. The central role women played in managing community-based organizations 
affiliated with Hamas and in leading the religious educational circles in the mosques, brought 
numbers of educated women from the local communities into more public spaces to act as 
religious mobilizers or preachers.4  
According to the articles in Hamas’s charter, Muslim women’s role is no less than 
men’s in the war of liberation against the enemy of Islam (Israel): women bear and raise male 
                                                             
2 Meir Litvak, “The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 34, no. 1 (1998):149–63; see also Sara Roy, “The Transformation of Islamic NGOs in Palestine,” 
Middle East Report 214 (2000): 24–26. 
3 Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (London: Hurst & Co., 2009). 
4 Islah Jad, “Between Religion and Secularism: Islamist Women of Hamas,” in Shifting Ground: Muslim Women 
in the Global Era, ed. Fereshteh Nouraie-Simone (New York: Feminist Press, 2005), 36–40. 
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children, play an important role in guiding and educating the next generation of men, and are 
equally agents of God..5 Consequently, some religious women have moved beyond the 
guiding role as presented in the charter to undertake leading positions in the public domain 
and have been able to gain social and political legitimacy without calling specifically for 
gender equality. 
According to Islah Jad’s 2005 study, Hamas has shown an increasing tendency to 
integrate women in the movement and its institutional structure. After the establishment of 
Hamas in 1987, the Salvation Party—Hamas’s political wing—was keen to bring women into 
the party structure at all levels. As one of thirteen departments in the party, the women’s 
department was represented in the General Conference, which is elected among the party 
members. The General Conference elects the central Consultative Council—consisting of 
men and women—which shapes the party’s general policy. In 2000, eight out of fifty-two 
members of the Consultative Council were women.  
In addition, as a means by which to add to their constituency, Hamas paid more 
attention to the idea of women’s political participation during the 2006 Palestinian legislative 
elections and integrated women’s issues in their electoral programs. Hamas focused on 
supporting women’s status away from Western social and cultural norms, instead assuring 
women’s legal rights through fair implementation of family laws; mobilizing women around 
Islamic values and educating them in sharia; emphasizing the role of family; and 
strengthening relationships among its members as the basis for the persistence of Islamic 
values and morals. The Hamas electoral program also emphasized that the Palestinian woman 
is a partner in struggle, resistance, and building society and needs to be protected from all 
types of social abuses. In the 2006 legislative election, Hamas won the majority of seats (77 
                                                             
5 See Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 
2000). I refer in my analysis to one of the Quranic verses cited in article 19 of the Hamas charter: “Lo, men who 
surrender unto Allah, and women who surrender and men who believe and women who believe, and men who 
obey and women who obey, . . . has prepared for them forgiveness and a vast reward,” Sura 33 (Al-Ahzab, the 
Clans), verse 35. 
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out of 132 total seats), five of which went to Hamas women’s candidates. Hamas women had 
a good chance of becoming elected officials.  
Hamas attitudes toward women’s role in society can appear fluctuating and 
contradictory, and depending on the changing political context. On the one hand, Hamas has 
been calling for sex segregation and veiling and rhetorically mobilizing for male guardianship 
over women and women’s economic dependence on men; on the other hand, it has been 
encouraging its female members to work in the public sector and take leadership positions in 
the movement’s institutions (government and nongovernment).6 While Hamas leadership 
positions remain restricted to educated and professional women, a large number of 
uneducated poor women have been actively engaged in Hamas community-based 
organizations located in camps and villages. Hamas female members and supporters have 
become willing to complete their education and to search for employment in the public sector 
and in nonstereotypically female domains such as media and university lecturing. Similar to 
Nariman, many educated and professional Hamas women have succeeded in gaining 
powerful autonomous positions within Hamas institutions and displacing some of the 
institutional social and gender norms. This has occurred either by challenging the dominant 
discourse of male religious authority, as appears in Jad’s earlier study of Hamas women, or 
by instrumentalizing the male dominant discourse, as Nariman’s example illustrates.  
In Jad’s study, Hamas women succeeded in shifting their discourse from a focus only 
on family issues to one that also considers issues related to women’s rights. Islamist women 
activists in Hamas admitted that Hamas had no vision or agenda for women’s issues, and they 
encouraged the reinterpretation of religious texts in order to allow new readings more 
relevant to modern society. Jad concluded that among Islamist women’s activists, there is no 
                                                             
6 In the first week of November 2013, Hamas appointed a young woman, Isra Al-Modallal, to be the Hamas 
government’s spokesperson. As stated in an article published by the Independent, 20 percent of public servants 
working for Hamas are women (Simon Usborne, “A Move in the Right Direction? After Years of Restricting 
Women’s Rights Hamas Hires Isra Al-Modallal as Its First Female Spokesperson,” The Independent,  
November 12, 2013).  
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singular model of agency, and there is no possibility for homogenization due to differences in 
class, education, employment, geographic location, religious, and daily practices. I would add 
to this list different individual capacities and personal characteristics. 
Building on Jad’s earlier argument and drawing upon empirical data gathered in 2012, 
I explore here how the moral agency of women in Gaza has developed, reflecting a longer 
experience of dynamic interaction between the ideal virtues of Islam, as articulated by 
religious women in Gaza, and their actual social and political practices. Furthermore, I 
explore how one religious woman’s experiences within an Islamic ethical framework of 
Gazan context have contributed to developing a more articulated form of agency that is 
critical and creative and, in some cases, counterhegemonic. The woman I discuss here is not 
fighting exactly the same battle as were the Hamas women Jad studied, despite similar 
educational and professional backgrounds.  
 
Narrating the Process of Becoming Religious 
Nariman began becoming religious through requestioning the meaning of her life and 
choosing to correct her life by becoming submissive to God and his commands:7 
Although my mother-in-law was teaching religious lessons and memorizing 
the Qur’an in mosques and my father-in-law was very religious, I was not 
religious, and religion was not a substantive part of my life. I lived with 
parents who did not restrict my movements or deprive me from doing 
whatever I wanted to do. My parents practiced Islam in a traditional way like 
most people in Gaza in the period of the 1970s and 1980s. In my first year of 
marriage, my father-in-law used to encourage me to practice Islam. I listened 
to him out of love and respect, but I was not in circumstances that provided 
                                                             
7 I conducted several interviews with Nariman in January and February 2012. All interviews were hold in her 
office in Gaza and were organized and recorded by my research assistant in Gaza, Andaleeb Udwan. I 
transcribed and translated the recorded interviews into English.    
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me with strong reasons to think seriously about religion until my father-in-law 
(my uncle) died suddenly despite being very strong and very healthy. That 
was the most shocking moment in my life. I loved him so much and I did not 
imagine he would pass away. He was the person who made my life 
meaningful. At that shocking moment, I started to ask about the meaning of 
the real life we live and the meaning of death. Is that the end of a human 
being—to be buried in a grave? What we are crying for as we all have the 
same destiny. We all die. This made me rethink life after death, consider the 
ultimate reality of our existence, and ponder what should I do in my real life 
to meet the other life satisfactorily. I woke up the second day with a strong 
desire to pray to God. I read surah Al-Fateha (the Opening Sura in the Qur’an) 
for the first time in my life in great depth and from my heart. I felt like I was 
kafera (atheist) before I discovered the truth of God. I felt for the first time 
what standing submissive to God, the creator of all, means. I spent days and 
days unable to sleep, staying up praying to my God and asking him to forgive 
me for my previous life. I want to be sure that my spiritual connection to God 
is real and determined.  
Unlike many other Palestinian religious women I know in Gaza (including relatives 
and friends), however, Nariman’s spiritual awakening resulted from an unexpected event not 
an authoritative process experienced at home or in wider society. Talal Asad has argued that 
power produces religiously defined knowledge and practices.8 Nariman’s spiritual awakening 
(following Peter Berger’s social constructionist argument9) was also not an attempt to create 
a social base for her existence—she was neither socially nor economically threatened by her 
                                                             
8 Talal Asad, “Anthropological Conception of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,” MAN, 18, no. 2 (1983): 237–59, 
esp. 237.  
9 Peter Berger, The Social Reality of Religion (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). 
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previous life style or by the sudden loss of her uncle. It also does not appear that Nariman’s 
religious awakening reflected an interest in having more power in her life as humanist 
theorist such as Raymond Firth have argued in other cases.10 Pursuing a psychological 
analysis, Nariman’s narration does not show that her religious awakening was a reflection of 
depression, anxiety, or fear of death.11 Her moment of spiritual awakening was linked to 
questions about the meaning and purpose of her life.  
Hamas religious authority and discourse have influenced the context in Gaza, where a 
large number of women practiced Islam to meet certain socioeconomic and political purposes 
and interests. Nariman’s religious awakening was primarily the result of an intersubjective 
contingency, which created a subjective emotional response reflective of her critical 
personality. It was a deep spiritual moment that provoked her to consider the meaning of life. 
I argue that the amalgamation of emotion and cognition in Nariman’s case is what shaped her 
agency differently from that of many mainstream Hamas women. This unique personal 
amalgamation enabled Nariman to expand her religious ideation and genuine feelings toward 
God into an earthly social model of life.  
Nariman did not feel satisfied in her religion simply by becoming a pious woman: only 
veiling, praying, and fasting and ideally practicing her gender within the normative views 
presented by the religious authority, as was the case of the mosque women Saba Mahmood 
described in her 2005 Politics of Piety.12 Nariman spent time worshipping God, which 
solidified the strength of her religious beliefs, yet worshipping by itself did not satisfy her 
socially constituted innate freedom as a modern subject. She started to question the 
relationship between divine reality and social and political life: How could she turn her deep 
                                                             
10 Raymond Firth, Religion: A Humanist Interpretation (London: Routledge, 1996).  
11 Ya-Hui Wen, “Religiosity and Death Anxiety,” Journal of Human Resource and Adult Learning 6, no. 2 
(2010): 31–37. 
12 Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2005).  
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beliefs in God into action in real life? she wondered. What practical knowledge was behind 
spiritual submission to God? What were the proper Islamic practices she would need to learn 
in order to live a meaningful life based on Islamic virtues?13 To answer these questions, 
Nariman explained: 
I decided to terminate my work with Al-Aqsa University, and dedicated 
myself for three years praying to my God, visiting the mosque and 
memorizing the Qur’an like many other religious women in Gaza. I spent all 
these years searching for convincing answers to my questions in life based on 
the Islamic knowledge as it is presented by well-versed Muslim women and 
men. I did not suffice with what is said. I used to go back home and read 
books about the interpretation of Islam from different sources: read the 
writings of Egyptian Islamist theorist Syed Qutb,14 Egyptian Islamic 
philosopher Hassan al-Banna, and many other books on Islamic interpretation. 
I realized after years of listening to preachers and reading about Islam that the 
real believer has not to stay only in the mosque for worshipping. This would 
not create a good Muslim. The real believer in Islam has to be integrated into 
social life to change it based on Islamic beliefs. The real Muslim is the one 
who is able to reflect on the effects of her practice of Islam on her social 
actions and relations at home, in the workplace, and in the wider society.  
Nariman states that she critically created her own understanding of women’s role in 
Islam by referring to Hassan al-Banna, the Islamist theorist and the founder of the Muslim 
                                                             
13 Daniel M. Varisco, Islam Obscured: The Rhetoric of Anthropological Representation (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2005). 
14 Syed Qutb was an Egyptian author and Islamist theorist and was a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. Qutb advocated overthrowing unjust rulers who pursue Western modernity 
and replacing them with Islamic rulers committed to Islamic ethics (see Ahmed El-Kadi, “Sayyid Qutb,” Islam 
101,  http://www.islam101.com/history/people/century20/syedQutb.htm).  
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Brotherhood in Egypt.15 However, Hassan al-Banna did not invite Muslim women to play the 
role that Nariman plays in the public domain. In his 1980 “Message to the Muslim Women,” 
al-Banna noted that women should work when necessary but not in principle. For al-Banna, 
women’s noble and significant role in Islam should be childbearing and motherhood; 
involvement in social and political activism would divert women’s attention from their 
principal role in the family.16  
As she attempts to prove that her goal of transferring the message of Islam goes 
beyond sexual differences, Nariman’s religious rhetoric contradicts her actual practice. She 
believes that Muslim men and women are equally responsible for Islamizing their society. I 
attribute the gender impartiality of Nariman’s reading and practice of Islam to her specific 
individual history. That is, she has not herself experienced gender bias or subordination and 
she was socially nurtured not to be constrained by her gender, which is reflected in the 
interpretation of her readings. On most occasions, Nariman refers to her path in life as one 
that any real Muslim—man or a woman—should follow:   
My ultimate goal since I chose to become religious has been to make my God 
satisfied with my practices and with what I achieve in real life following His 
commands. The mundane life is just a passage for al-akhira, so it is the setting 
for both women and men to practice the proper Islam. I determined my views 
toward my religion and my religiosity, after I read the works of Hassan al-
Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. After all my readings, I 
developed my own vision that women have to play a key role in building a 
real Muslim society: go out from home to spread the message of Islam and to 
                                                             
15 See Mariz Tadros’s discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamist discourse based on the religious 
philosophy of Hassan al Banna, the founder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, in “The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Gender Agenda: Reformed or Reframed?” Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin 42, no. 1 (2011): 88–
98. 
16 Ibid., 92. 
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liberate Muslim people from all forms of fears they experienced in real life, 
and only to fear God. Only with this state of faith in God, will women not be a 
source of fitna (chaos) and will not be humiliated by any human. They rather 
become an important source for constructive change in their society.  
Nariman, unlike her intellectual reference Hassan al-Banna, asserts that a Muslim 
woman must occupy a good position in public life, not for the sake of competing with men 
but rather to join them in spreading the divine message of Islam. She decided to go back to 
work again, but only after she finished her master’s in Islamic studies, when she felt equipped 
with authentic Islamic knowledge and interpretation. She selected how and where to work: as 
a lecturer’s assistant at the Islamic University where she could contribute to spreading the 
message of Islam. During her work in the Islamic University, Nariman started to read about 
the Muslim Brotherhood in more detail, focusing on their ideology and politics. When she 
heard that Hamas adopts the Muslim Brotherhood religious and political approach, she 
started to look for its members (women and men) and talked with them to confirm that they 
shared her way of thinking: “I decided to see what is written in the books I read in real life,” 
she said.  
Nariman realized early on that involvement in Hamas would not be an easy task. She 
would have to go through an educational process and commit to Hamas’s public mobilization 
activities: 
I spent a year attending every religious and political activity Hamas 
organized. Whenever I heard about religious lessons in a mosque, even if it 
was far from where I live, I attended and participated in it. When I felt that I 
had become intellectually and emotionally attached to Hamas movement, I 
proposed my interest in becoming a member of Hamas. Their reply was so 
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encouraging, as well as so friendly and kind. Being a member of Hamas as a 
political party was a great challenge to continuing my journey as a Muslim 
woman with double goals: Islamic mobilization for the sake of God and 
political and social mobilization to help strengthen Hamas’s goal of 
constructing an Islamic state.  
Nariman admits that her intellectual and political loyalty to Hamas and her 
commitment to follow the orders of Hamas leaders was because she considered the 
organization and its leaders to be the successors of God on earth. Nevertheless, her narration 
shows that many of her decisions and actions were self-initiated and based on her capacity to 
communicate and negotiate her moral arguments at her home, in the workplace, and in the 
wider community. According to Nariman:  
When I decided to become a member of Hamas, none of my family members 
belonged to Hamas. They were all moderately religious. It was I who decided 
to restructure the family based on my religious and political beliefs. My belief 
in Hamas, as the holder of God’s message in earth, inspired me to transform 
my family members, and helped them (men and women) to become not only 
aware of Islam and committed to its commands but also members of Hamas. 
God bless them, they are all Hamas supporters now, and they (men and 
women) are actively involved in all Hamas activities. 
Nariman ended her discussion about joining Hamas by referring to her subjectivity 
before she became religious—the one nurtured by her father—and presented it as a strong 
base for the distinctive shaping of her religious subjectivity: “I know that I am a powerful 
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woman, the daughter of my father, Al-Haj Fadel.17 I learned in my life that when I want to do 
something, I just do it. You imagine this power accompanies submission to God and His 
commands. It becomes perfect.”  
In 2008, Nariman was offered a senior job with the Hamas government to head the 
Women Police in the Gaza Strip. Nariman’s appointment represents the first time under 
Islamist rules that a woman has held a position whose major responsibilities are enforcement 
of both civic and sharia laws. According to the Islamic tradition, such a position does not 
match with women’s biological and psychological nature, which, following al-Banna’s 
philosophy, lacks firmness. Nevertheless, Nariman notes that she was offered the job for two 
reasons: her knowledge of Islamic laws and rules and her strong personality and ability to 
enforce laws and regulations to protect the security of people, especially women. 
Although Nariman was offered the job, not everyone in Hamas lauded her 
appointment, which created tension among the more conservative and reformist male leaders 
of Hamas. Female leaders of Hamas pressured the government, arguing that having an 
independent Women’s Police Unit was important to preventing the sexual harassment of 
women that is often common in a mixed-sex police force controlled by men. Nariman did not 
hesitate to accept the position, but not because she had concerns with gender equity or 
equality in Hamas institutions. Rather, she wanted to meet the challenge of transferring the 
Islamic message to her society’s institutions. In Nariman’s mind, the purpose of the Women’s 
Police Unit is not to equalize men with women but rather to preserve the dignity of Muslim 
women based on the Islamic virtues of sex segregation in the workplace and in the field. With 
regard to her position as the head of the Women’s Police Unit, she excitedly and proudly 
described her contribution to changing negative societal stereotypes toward policewomen: 
                                                             
17 Al-Haj Fadel is Nariman’s father. He is a well-known trader with a good reputation among his family and in 
the wider community. 
Comment [HLM1]: Better? 
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I accepted this position with an aim to challenge the negative social and 
cultural image of Muslim police women. I succeeded in managing this 
institution on a professional basis and achieving recognition from Hamas, 
from Gazan society, and even from abroad. Many Muslim brothers from 
Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt came to visit us and they were impressed with our 
pioneering experience. The common idea that the veil restricts women from 
being a policewoman is not true. We were trained in the use of weapons while 
veiled. During the three-month training, we used the more practical Pakistani 
dress style (long salwar shirt with a flowing trouser). In order not to avoid 
mixing with men, two women first got intensive training by men and then 
they became responsible for training other women. We also received 
education on sharia and international laws and their implementation. Although 
policewomen are only responsible for enforcing those laws that pertain to 
women’s affairs, in some cases, policewomen join policemen for home 
inspections to ensure that women’s privacy is maintained inside their homes. 
Nevertheless, police women follow the same rules and regulations as 
policemen. 
With regard to how decisions are made in the Women’s Police Unit, Nariman said: 
All decisions related to the day-to-day operations of the Women’s Police Unit  
are made by me. Supreme decisions are usually made in consultation with the 
general director of police. We still live in a society where men make most of 
the decisions, but my position has allowed me to go beyond these cultural 
norms. When I agree with the general director on a decision, I implement the 
decision, even if other male officers disagree with it. A large proportion of my 
15 
 
work is done in consultation with men but is based on the moral virtues of 
Islam.  
The Kantian liberal conception of the morally autonomous agent treats the individual 
as the end of a virtuous moral life, which is shaped by individuals’ use of reason and exercise 
of will and not forced by external metaphysical or human forces,18 Nariman’s moral actions, 
however, are not necessarily fully initiated on her own away from any external forces. 
Rather, she has shaped her moral actions within the moral boundaries of the external religious 
authoritative forces, justifying that that those external forces represent the highest good—the 
word of God. Within the Islamist authoritative process, Nariman talked confidently about 
how she set up a separate managerial system for the Women’s Police Unit, as well as her 
capacity to communicate and negotiate work problems and decisions with men in power, 
including general directors and ministers. 
Nariman’s ambitious desire to apply her Islamic virtues to her social life has moved 
beyond her activism in the Hamas movement and commitment to her job responsibilities as 
the head of the Women’s Police Unit. She expanded her activism to the humanitarian field 
separate from the direct authority of Hamas, stating that this would increase her rewards from 
God. She established and heads the board of trustees of a community-based organization in 
Rafah that provides child care and vocational training for women in order to become 
economically independent. She asserts that this organization is independent from Hamas, 
serving people regardless of their political and religious affiliation. Nariman asserts that she 
searched for funding to operate the charity organization from different sources and to ensure 
a secure job for around thirty-five female employees. Religious virtues provide Nariman with 
                                                             
18 Elizabeth M. Bucar, “Dianomy: Understanding Religious Women’s Moral Agency as Creative Conformity,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 78, no. 3 (2010): 662–86, esp. 667. 
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the wider framework on which she can weave deep connections between the politics of her 
religion and her social and personal life.19  
Nariman concluded her discussions with me by talking about her marriage and family 
life. She married during her first year of university at eighteen. She was reluctant to marry, 
assuming that doing so would restrain her personal freedom and mobility. Before she became 
religious, Nariman believed Western modernity was a good model for liberating women. She 
considered the social and cultural constraints imposed on women, including the veil, as 
meaningless. Nariman described herself as rebellious, demanding, and ambitious, which are 
atypical characteristics of Palestinian women living in a patriarchal society. Some might 
argue that perhaps Nariman’s parents had cultivated some more traditionally masculine traits 
in their eldest daughter to compensate for their inability to have a son. However, Nariman 
conveyed that her parents love and respect each other and regard their daughters as equally as 
valuable as if they had been sons. Nariman asserts that she lived in a female-empowering 
family atmosphere, which I argue contributed considerably to the formation of her unique 
contradictory and critical model of moral agency.  
According to Nariman, her husband has not been introduced to any liberal thoughts 
toward women and he follows the mainstream combined modern-traditional sociocultural 
norms that have historically characterized Palestinian society under the Israeli occupation.20 
His understanding of gender is obviously influenced by his relationship with his wife, whom 
he loves very much. He was influenced by her choice to turn to religion and has since been 
committed to the practice of Islam. Nariman’s husband is a businessman, and their family 
does not rely on Nariman’s economic contribution. According to al-Banna’s Islamic 
                                                             
19 Janice Boddy, “Who is the Human in Humanitarianism?” (paper presented at the Conference on Faith, 
Religion, and Humanitarianism, Cairo, Egypt, May 23–25, 2008).  
20 Frances Hasso, “The Women’s Front: Nationalism, Feminism and Modernity in Palestine,” Gender and 
Society 12, no. 4 (1998): 441–65. 
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interpretation, the work Nariman does is not economically necessary; ideally, she should stay 
home to support her husband and children. Nevertheless, Nariman asserts that her husband 
strongly supports her professional work and her involvement in social and political activism, 
which takes her outside the home and away from her family for long hours. Her husband 
financially supports her work and activism by paying for their children’s education, which is 
supposed to be the mother’s role in the Islamic tradition. He also performs some traditionally 
female domestic responsibilities. According to Nariman, 
My husband does not interfere with how I manage between my work and my 
home’s responsibilities. Instead, he has helped me because he supports my 
divine message in life. I am so lucky to have a husband that makes things so 
easy for me. He meets all the needs of the house, including shopping for my 
children and myself. He is a responsible husband and father, and our relation 
is not marred by any defects. 
She adds: 
You can’t imagine how my religiosity affects our marriage relations. Before I 
became religious, things were always tense between my husband and me. I 
was a spoiled girl before and after marriage. I couldn’t obey my husband’s 
orders like other women in Gaza. In the early years of marriage, I was very 
demanding and arrogant. After I became religious, my personality 
fundamentally changed; I got rid of my arrogant behavior and became calm 
and tolerant with my husband. He responded by becoming more loving and 
supportive. I go to Egypt several times a year to work on my PhD and I leave 
my children under his responsibility. He never complains about what I am 
doing and he is happy to see me successful. 
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This is an example of conjugal relations influenced by Nariman’s religiosity that 
complies with neither the patriarchal cultural norms in Gaza nor the traditional Islamic 
rhetoric adopted by Hamas. 
 
The Moral Agency of Women in Gaza: A Unique Example 
Nariman’s model of agency does not fit neatly with the three main theories of feminist 
moral agency: liberal, which considers individual autonomy as the determinant of women’s 
agency21; nonliberal, which views women’s self-realization and autonomy as an outcome of 
their subordination by patriarchal culture and religion and does not confine it to resistance 
against patriarchy22; or poststructural, which views gender as contextually and historically 
constructed, as well as resisted and de-essentializing women’s agency as a universal singular 
model.23 Nariman’s agency can be seen as a combination of all three. Casting herself as an 
equal agent of God, her nontraditional gender performance is not framed to gain political 
power or to reconstruct societal gender norms. Rather, she instrumentalizes the gender 
discourse of the religious authority to meet her strategic goals in life, to consolidate her 
ideology—to transfer the commands of God on earth. As she explains, “I am happy to follow 
any orders from Hamas politicians, being a minister or sitting at home, as long as what I do is 
serving my goal of raising the banner of Islam. If I ever feel that Hamas leaders deviate from 
the practice of true Islam, I will leave, even if I am a minister.” 
Nariman’s model of religious agency confirms gender theorist Judith Butler’s view 
that “using non-normative gender practice for the purpose of mobilizing normative gender 
                                                             
21 Sandra Bartky, Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New York: 
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23 See Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Henrietta Moore, The Subject of 
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norms is a dynamic used by agents to legitimize the authority of a certain ideology.”24 Thus 
the gender of Nariman, according to Butler, “is not exactly what (she) ‘is.’ It is the apparatus 
by which the production and normalization of masculine and feminine take place along with 
the interstitial forms of performative that gender assumes.”25 Although Nariman’s 
performance of her moral agency does not operate within the poststructural framing of 
resistance adopted by Butler for the “deidealization and divestiture” of discursive gender 
norms,26 it successfully contributes to resignifying gender norms from the social and cultural 
domain to the divine domain, which is considered by nonliberals as a source of empowerment 
for women.27  
Nariman resignifies and redefines her gender in relation to God but not in relation to 
men, emphasizing that God is the super power that both women and men have to submit to 
equally. At the same time, she insists, in her religious rhetoric, that she is committed to the 
Islamist interpretation of women’s role in Muslim society. For example, she supports 
principles of men’s qawamah (men’s leadership and guardianship), even though it is not 
practiced in her personal and professional life. She supports men’s right to polygamy, while 
she believes that this will never happen in her own marriage. And she advocates for sex 
segregation despite her continuous connection and interaction with men in her workplace and 
in the public.  
Despite the autonomous and voluntary efforts Nariman has undertaken through her 
social, political, and religious activism, she emphasizes her obedience to the orders of Hamas 
leaders as long as she believes that those leaders are the representatives of God’s word on 
earth. Her specific conception of obedience does not distract from the autonomy and the 
                                                             
24 Ibid., 42.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 48. 
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freedom of agency that is only authorized by its submission to God and His commands. 
Obedience to God and the exercising of one’s free will do not appear contradictory in 
Nariman’s assertion of agency, as long as her obedience to God is a “consciously willed 
action.”28 Nariman’s disregard of her obedience to men can be socially perceived, according 
to Butler, as a mechanism that provides her particular nonnormative gender practices with “a 
grid of legibility” and recognizability, but also creates the possibility and potential to 
deconstruct gender norms in social life through the agent’s capacity of resignification of 
bodily performance.29  
The contradictory aspect of Nariman’s agency, or according to Butler, her failure to 
approximate the ideal gender within the discursive Islamic tradition, is a reflection of 
Nariman’s capacity to question herself and to shape her own understanding of the ideal, 
whether based on Islamic or non-Islamic ideology. This capacity is not only a by-product of 
the temporality of her choice to become religious and its resulting bodily performance but 
also substantially influenced by her previous gendered subjectivity as a nonreligious woman, 
which was “not governed quite as much.”30 Her critical and rebellious personality and her 
refusal to be fully controlled by others are the authentic features of her subjectivity. Her 
willingness and desire to be an ideal Muslim woman does not uproot these personal 
characteristics, which she has constituted over the course of her life. She rather dynamically 
invests in them to act differently. She acts with multiple subjectivities created and developed 
in different contexts with different discourses, through which she has habituated her gender 
by using contradictory modalities of actions. Her genuine personality is evoked to create a 
critical model of religious subjectivity that transcends the mainstream gender Islamist 
structure and discourse for which she herself advocates. Nariman’s opposition to dominant 
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social gender norm occurs within normative Islamic ideology, which allows her to liberate 
herself from the control of the norm.31 This is illustrated by Nariman’s continuous persistence 
that she acts as an agent of God and does not fear anyone (humans) except God.  
 
Same Discursive Tradition but Different Habituation of Moral Agency 
Despite the same discursive tradition that frames the moral agency of both Nariman 
and the mosque women in Saba Mahmood’s Piety of Politics, the dynamic exercise of agency 
in each operates differently. Unlike mosque women, Nariman’s ideal practice of religiosity 
does not operate in harmony with “the socially prescribed forms of behaviors.”32 Nariman 
insists in her narration that she wants to be unique in her practice of religiosity. She rejects 
being compared with uneducated women who orient their religiosity to signify masculine 
representation of society or harmonize their bodily gender performance with the discursive 
tradition. Nariman reflects on her education and upbringing, which have both allowed her to 
shape her own understanding and practice of religiosity. She challenges the Kantian theory of 
the irrationality of religious beliefs by emphasizing that God’s commands are the “highest 
good” that has the quality to make a better life for her and for all moral agents. Her belief in 
Islam as the “highest good” inspired her to learn more about the religion and to strategize her 
social and political acts as a real Muslim woman responsible for transforming the society to 
be governed by the word of God but not by the religious authority and its traditional 
discourse, unless the latter actually represents the word of God.  
The model of agency I pursue in this essay is not merely a result of the abstracted 
divine ideation and truth and the habituation of normative Islamic virtues for the sake of 
personal happiness and purity as it is shown in Mahmood’s model of pious agency. It is also a 
                                                             
31 Butler, Undoing Gender, 49. 
32 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 149. 
22 
 
political model of agency shaped by the agent’s capacity to negotiate the ideal with the real 
not only to achieve self-realization but also, and perhaps more important, to reflect the newly 
constituted subject centered on religious virtues into a recognizable and valuable social and 
political position in her wider society. Unlike Mahmood’s model, Nariman’s religiosity is not 
just subjective, aiming to harmonize her conduct with her innate desire to be submissive to 
God. It is also political, through which she contributes to shaping and reshaping the politics 
of her religion in the wider society. Although she does not claim that she seeks social and 
political recognition and value based on the liberatory feminist approach, she achieves a 
political outcome as a result of the dynamic connection between her ideal Islamic virtues and 
real social and political life.  
Nevertheless, Nariman’s model of agency appears consonant with Mahmood’s model 
of moral agency at the early phase of the self-making process. During that period, Nariman 
was mainly concerned to habituate her religiosity to be determined about her willing and 
desired subject as a pious woman. Yet her agency had not taken a singular form, nor did it 
remain constant and harmonic as in its early phase. Her experience goes beyond the harmonic 
subjective model and has shifted gradually from being purely spiritual and moral—concerned 
about the consistency between the ideal and the bodily practice—to becoming socially and 
politically connected to everyday life. Through this shift, her gender performance has 
gradually been deidealized in relation to socially prescribed forms of behavior. The process 
of shifting, which includes continuous encounter with her social world, fosters a contradiction 
between the Islamic ideal and its actual practice, not because, as stated by Mahmood, she 
failed to adequately form her pious self. On the contrary, Nariman’s pride in the fact that her 
practice of piety is unique and sometimes inconsistent with mainstream religious practices is 
demonstrated in her argument that there is no perfection in women’s practice of Islam unless 
it’s reflected in their day-to-day life. 
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Another critique of Mahmood’s model of pious agency regards the dichotomous 
relationship between virtuous performance and will, emotions and desire—one necessarily 
produces the other. Mahmood challenges the liberal notion of agency by emphasizing that 
women’s virtuous performance is not “manifestation of their individual will but more as 
actions that produce the will in its particularity.”33 In Nariman’s case, her virtuous 
performance has taken multiple and contradictory forms throughout the process of learning 
and practicing her Islamic virtues. According to her life story, it is primarily her desire, 
emotions, and will that constitute her choice of becoming religious; reshape her cognition and 
rationalization of religion; and motivate her capacity to reshape her particular bodily 
performance—not to suffice with worshipping but to be widely connected with social life. At 
the same time, her experience of shifting from a spiritual to a social and political agent 
contributes to create different forms of desire, as well as capacities that are reflected in 
continuous changes in her bodily performance—dislocating gender segregation in the work 
place and traveling on her own. In Nariman’s case, the interconnection of her desire, personal 
characteristics, cognition, and reiterated performances shape her specific multiple and 
contradictory model of agency.  
Moreover, for Mahmood, religious women operate “neither to invoke a self-constituting 
autonomous subject nor subjectivity as a private space of cultivation,” but to realize a certain 
kind of state of happiness, purity, wisdom, and perfection in harmony with a particular 
discursive tradition.34 The subject of this essay has rather pragmatically demonstrated her 
religious agency by breaking down stereotypical stasis based on the embodied patriarchal 
culture and gender norms that meet her wider political goal of Islamizing the society. She 
invoked her autonomy and inner freedom to cultivate space in politics and remains certain 
that this space brings her God’s rewards. Although Nariman’s autonomy operates within 
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sociopolitical and cultural norms and discourses governed by Islamic ideology, she shows 
high individual capacity to critique these norms without distracting the dominant Islamic 
ideology. 
The subject of this essay is consistent with Elizabeth Bucar’s innovative model of 
moral agency and Judith Butler’s conceptualization of the gendered subject that arises 
through normative social norms but also creates possibilities and potential for deconstruction 
and subversion. Bucar combines liberal and nonliberal models of agency to conceptualize 
women’s agency using the concept of dianomy, which for Bucar means the “dual law” that 
includes both autonomy (self-law controlled by individual agent) and heteronomy (external 
law exemplified in religious authority) as sources of the moral agency.35 According to Bucar 
and as revealed in Nariman’s narration, moral agency is shaped not only by the discursive 
habituation of tradition but also by a woman’s individual capacity to shape her own 
understanding of religion and to habituate it inconsistently with the discursive tradition. 
Nariman embraced her Islamic virtues in a critical way that enables her to question the limit 
of the existing traditional gender norms in order to meet her goal to Islamize society.36 She 
wanted to be a unique model of the ideal Muslim women. Her model of agency is, however, 
shaped within the discursive dominant Islamist discourse. Its performance is contingent and 
yet not completely compliant with the gender categories of the given discourse.  
Arguably, all women—religious and nonreligious—are social beings, dynamically 
interacting with social environments, responding to multiple discourses, and reflecting on 
diverse individual histories. This interaction and reflection generate possibilities for creative 
acts of agency, including within discourses that are drawn from the subordination of women 
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pursuing male dominant religious interpretations.37 Unlike Butler’s thought of agency, 
creative and critical moral agency does not always serve resistance against tradition but it can 
also operate to confirm it, which Bucar terms “creative conformity.”38  
 
Nariman’s moral agency is not just spiritualist, focusing on worshipping God. Rather, 
it confirms her connections with her individual and collective history and with the dynamic 
social environment in which she lives. Her willing subject becomes a by-product of the 
dynamic interconnection between divine beliefs and real social life. If we assume that change 
in women’s agency is not merely contextually specific but also self-reflective, self-creative, 
and based on each individual’s capacities and experiences, then it makes no sense to consider 
change based on singular models, including moral ones. It is not possible to perceive 
women’s agency as purely a moral or purely a rational subjectivity, as uniquely ideal or 
uniquely real just because the morals and the ideal—religious or nonreligious—are also not 
fixed.  
Yet Nariman’s multifaceted and contradictory form of agency has not been formed in 
a vacuum. It has been influenced by several objective and subjective factors: the motivating 
sociopolitical and institutional context under the control of Hamas, where religious agency is 
exercised relatively freely and its autonomous voluntary actions centered on religion are 
legitimized; the multiple discourses a woman experiences in her lifetime and how she 
negotiates them in her day-to-day practice; the diverse individual history and personality of 
the agent; and the individual capacity and skills attained through the negotiation of religious 
knowledge and beliefs with material, professional, and social life.  
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My analysis also shows that the relationship between religious subjects and religious 
institutions of power and between religious rhetoric and actual practice is more dynamic and 
critical where there is a possibility for individual religious women to build on their social and 
political engagement to resignify the dominant religious meanings and practices. The moral 
agency of women involves a reflection on how to operate the relationship between moral 
motivations and everyday life, and how much the practice of Islamic virtues and their 
ideological and political goals contribute to changing social relations of power.  
Nariman’s unique model of agency illustrates one of many diverse models of religious 
women’s agency, which result from the differences in women’s individual histories and 
capacities to connect the ideal with the social and political. Feminist scholars should therefore 
consider the diversity in the dynamic relationship between the ideal and social and how 
women differently engage with religion in their social and political lives in order to uncover 
the ambiguity of moral agency.  
 
